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Abstract. In many magic tricks, magicians fool their audience by performing a mock action (a so-called “ruse”), which merely 
serves the purpose of providing a seemingly natural explanation for visible movements that are actually part of the secret move 
they want to hide from the audience. Here, we discuss a special magic ruse in which the action of secretly putting something 
somewhere is “explained away” by the mock action of fetching something from the same place, or vice versa. Interestingly, the 
psychological principles underlying the amazing potency and robustness of this technique seem to be very similar to the general 
perceptual principles underlying figure-ground perception and the assignment of border ownership. This analogy may be useful 
for exploring the possibility that this and similar magical effects involve immediate “unconscious inferences” about intentions 
more akin to perceptual processing than to explicit deliberations based on a reflective 'theory' of mind. 
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Before reading on, you might want to view the excellent performance of Slydini’s paperballs-to-hat routine 
available at https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lvkRQgiwT0w (movie last accessed on Feb. 13
th
 2015, description 
of the trick available in Milbourne, 2008, pp. 78-80). Here, the magician makes several paperballs disappear, and at 
the end of the performance they are mysteriously shown to be contained in a hat lying on the table, even though the 
hat was shown to be empty at the beginning of the performance. After viewing this performance, observers 
typically have no clue as to how the magician was able to get the balls into the hat.  
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Fig 1: Illustration of the analogy between border ownership assignment in figure-ground perception and the assignment of “movement 
ownership” in the perception of actions. The contours in (a) are ambiguous and can be “owned” either by a vase (b) or two faces (c), or both 
at the same time (d). The visual system typically avoids the latter double assignment of border-ownership (“mosaic interpretation”) where the 
contours belong both to the vase and the faces (d). Analogously, the motion of the magician’s hand into the hat and back is ambiguous in the 
sense that it may involve putting an object into the hat (f), fetching and object from the hat (g), or both at the same time (h). The latter double 
assignment of the “put” and “fetch” actions to the back-and-forth movement (h) seems to be avoided in much the same way as the 
assignment of double border ownership in figure-ground perception (d). This could explain why we are so easily fooled by this kind of 
magical ruse. 
Why do people usually have such a hard time figuring out the deceivingly simple secret behind this trick—which is 
that the magician puts the balls into the hat while pretending to fetch some invisible magic powder from it? Would 
it not be relatively easy to figure out that the magician can put something into the hat whenever he reaches into it?  
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We believe that an interesting analogy between this magical effect and the more well-known principles of figure-
ground perception may point to an answer to this question. To appreciate this analogy, consider that when a 
magician moves his hand from A to B and back again (Fig. 1a), this can, in principle be interpreted as three 
different intentional actions:  He puts something from A to B (Fig. 1b), he fetches something at location B and 
places it at A (Fig. 1c), or he actually does both (Fig. 1d)
1
. Importantly, note the analogy to the perception of the 
central image contours in Rubin’s (1915) famous face-vase demonstration (Fig. 1e): In principle, they can be 
interpreted as reflecting three different real-world situations: A vase on a ground extending behind it (Fig. 1f), two 
faces on a ground extending behind them (Fig. 1g), or a mosaic of a vase-shaped object which happens to fit in 
snugly between two face-shaped objects (Fig. 1h).  
In much the same way as the central borders can be “owned” either by the face or the vase, the back and forth 
movement of the magician’s hand can owned by a “putting action” or a “fetching action”. Importantly, research on 
figure-ground perception has shown that the visual system systematically avoids the double assignment of border 
ownership associated with the mosaic interpretation (Driver & Baylis, 1996).  That is, it adheres to the general 
principle of exclusive allocation, according to which “a sensory element should not be used in more than one 
description at a time” (Bregman, 1994, p. 12). Thus, in the paperballs-to-hat routine, the sensory element (the 
actual back and forth movement), being allocated to the “mock” action of “fetching dust”, is not available for 
allocation to the action of putting things into the hat anymore. 
In a more general sense, this kind of ambiguity, where a competitive interpretation is “eliminated” from awareness, 
characterizes the perception of bistable figures in general (Leopold & Logothetis, 1999; Tormey & Tormey, 
1983).The surprising potency and robustness of the above magic trick can be elegantly explained by assuming that 
the visual system also adheres to this rule by avoiding the double assignment of “movement ownership” associated 
with the “put-and-fetch action” interpretation (Fig. 1d): Our visual system simply won’t produce more than one of 
the two potential action descriptions (“putting” or “fetching”) of the hand motion at the same time. As is well 
known, this general principle can be motivated by the fact that it tends to give right answers about how the visual 
input was actually generated (Bregman, 1994; Freeman, 1994; Albert & Hoffman, 1995) by avoiding 
interpretations involving unlikely coincidences: In the case of figure-ground perception double border ownership 
assignment would correspond to a highly unlikely jig-saw-puzzle-like alignment of the contours of two different 
surfaces, and in the case of action perception, the double assignment of movement ownership would correspond to 
the very unlikely situation where an object needs to be moved from A to B while another one also needs to be 
moved from B to A at the same time. The unlikeliness of this is precisely the reason why the magician has to come 
up with a mock action (or “ruse”), such as “fetching some magic dust from the hat”, or “getting the magic wand out 
of his pocket” (while actually ditching a “vanishing” coin, see https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=E6VWi7IaroA, 
movie last accessed on Feb. 13
th
 2015). 
At least since the seminal writings of Michotte (1950/1991) and Heider and Simmel (1944), scholars have noticed 
that high-level representations such as intentions attributed to motion can actually have strong perceptual qualities. 
Michotte (1950/1991) and Heider and Simmel (1944), demonstrated that people readily attribute animacy 
(intentions) and emotions to mechanical motion of simple geometric shapes. The automaticity and directness with 
which this happens surely suggest that the process underlying this is more akin to unconscious perceptual inference 
than to deliberate reasoning about likely intentions of the agent. In fact, undoing this requires deliberate thinking, as 
when trying to see only the proximal inputs of the apple without seeing the full apple (as in amodal volume 
completion, see Ekroll, Sayim & Wagemans, 2013). Convergent evidence from phenomenology (Gallagher, 2008), 
neuroscience (Blakemore & Decety, 2001) and experimental psychology (Scholl & Gao, 2013) now supports the 
                                                          
1 It may be of some interest to note that also a fourth interpretation is logically possible, namely that nothing is put or fetched at all, but 
just kept in the hand all the time. In terms of the analogy to border ownership, this may be said to correspond to a contour without 
surfaces on either side.  
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idea that any action is immediately perceived as having an intention or end goal, with a concomitant sense of visual 
presence.  
One might ask why we inevitably perceive movements as intentions. The encoding of perceived movements in 
terms of end goals (intentions) attests to the predictive nature of perception (Van de Cruys & Wagemans, 2011). A 
perceived intention represents a movement more efficiently as part of a predictable chain of interdependent events, 
disregarding the fine details of the movements. Framing this within Bayesian or predictive models of perception 
shows that the exclusive allocation can also be considered a form of “explaining away” (Kersten, Mamassian, & 
Yuille, 2004). Specifically, if the same inputs (movement details) can be explained by two different hypotheses, 
heightening the probability of one explanation, e.g. by contextual cues, will automatically reduce the probability of 
the other hypothesis. To paraphrase the classic example for “explaining away”: the hypothesis that it just rained 
will be quasi-eliminated as an explanation for a wet lawn, once one notices a leaky garden hose lying around. 
The present phenomenon can be described as one movement “overshadowing” the other in the spectator’s mind: 
Either the forward “putting movement” overshadows the backward “fetching” movement, or vice versa. Many 
similar effects, where specific movements tend to overshadow others are well known to magicians (Kurtz, 1998). 
One general rule of thumb routinely used by magicians is that large movements tend to make smaller ones go 
unnoticed. In the paddle-move for instance, the large sweeping motion of a paddle (or any stick-like object) makes 
it very difficult to notice that it is also simultaneously rotated along its long axis (Hergovich, Gröbl, & Carbon, 
2011). On a general level, all of these effects seem to work by making one of the movements more conspicuous 
than the other, whereby the latter can be manipulated relying on different factors. The present effect is probably no 
exception to this rule, but the cues that determine the relative dominance of the two possible interpretations are 
probably more subtle than the gross differences in motion size underlying the paddle move effect. Another 
important difference is that the paddle move involves two simultaneously performed movements, while the present 
effect involves a forward and a backward motion performed in succession. Furthermore, while it makes sense to 
speak of a fundamental ambiguity between the two (or strictly speaking, three) possible interpretations in the 
present case, the paddle move does not seem to involve any principled ambiguity, but rather seems to be driven by 
limits of the perceptual system (Hergovich et al., 2011). 
In conclusion, we generalized the principle of exclusive allocation to action-intention perception and described how 
it is exploited in magic tricks. This case study underscores the usefulness of magic to uncover general principles in 
perception and cognition (Kuhn, Amlani, & Rensink, 2008). 
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